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The paper stresses the evolutionary and adaptive experience of
Latin American growth between 1950 and1980,and provides a synthetic view
by considering the sources of growth within a simple production framework.
Regressions use quinquennial panel data for 18 Latin American countries.
They provide an estimate of the net return to investment, of the elasticity
of output to labor and of the contribution of other variables with
influence on efficiency. The regressions show that Latin American growth
varied systematically with trade performance.
The paper provides information on the effects of inflation upon
per capita income growth in the region. There is a negative correlation: an
inflation rate of even 20 percent reduces the per capita growth rate by 0.4
percentage point, or almost 1.5 percent of the regional mean of 3 percent
growth between 1950 and 1980. This result does not hold, however, once high
inflation observations are excluded.
Finally we call attention to the persistent problems of income
distribution and poverty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the thirty years between 1950 and 1980., Latin America
experienced rapid growth. During this period, output as measured in adjusted
purchasing power tens, expanded at an annual rate of 5.8 percent, with per
capita increases averaging 3 percent a year. Table 1 provides country detail.
The clear star performer is Brazil, whose share in regional product increased
from less than a quarter to more than a third. At the other extreme are two
groups. One isthe Southern Cone, Argentina, Chileand Uruguay, whose1950
leading position intheregion was eroded by muchlessthan normal
performance. The other laggards include a variety of smaller countries,
severalin Central America.
The average Latin American record, viewed from immediate post-World
War II perspective, is impressive. The target of the Alliance for Progress,
implemented in 1961, was an annual rate of 2 percent per capita. European per
capita income growth in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution was 1.3
percent from 1850 to 1900 and 1.4 percent between 1900 and 1950. Long term
United States economic growth has been at 1.8 percent.
Yet two factors combine to make the 1950-1980 Latin American growth
performance seem less positive. One is its, dramaticreversalin the 1980s.
Latin America has retrogressed in this decade, with product falling at a rate
of 1.4 percent, as recorded in table 1. This is a generalized regionalSources: Robert Suers and Alan Heston, Improved International Comparisons of Real
Product and its Composition: l950-l98O, Review of Income and tjealth, June 1984; and
ECLA, Preliminary overview of the Latin AmeritaaEconomv. 1988.
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GDP per Capita
Table I : Per Capita Gross Domestic Output and Growth Rates of Latin
American Countriest
(percent and dollars of 1975)
Share in Total Share in Growth Rate of
Population Regional CDP GD? per Capita
(percent) (percent) Dollars of 1975 (percent per year)
1980 1950 1980 1950 1980 1950-80 1980-88
Brazil 35.6 22.2 34.2 637 2,152 4.2 0.2
Mexico 20.2 18.5 23.1 1.055 2,547 3.0 -1.3
Argentina 8.0 21.2 11.8 1.877 3,209 1.8 -1.9
Colombia 7.5 7.2 6.3 949 1,882 2.3
'li teU.5f) :I:
Chile 3.2 5.7 3.4 1416 2,372 1.8 0.2
Uruguay 0.8 3.1 1.2 2,184 3.269 1.4 -1.2
Ecuador 2.3 1.4 1.6 638 1,556 3.1 -0.9
Guatemala 2.0 1.6 1.2 842 1,422 1.8 -2.4
Dominican Rep. 1.7 1.1 1.1 719 1,564 2.6 0.2
Bolivia 1.6 1.4 0.8 762 1,114 13 -3.3
El Salvador 1.3 0.8 0.5 612 899 1.3 -1.9
Paraguay 0.9 0.8 0.7 885 1,753 2.4 -0.4
Costa Rica 0.6 0.5 0.6 819 2,170 3.3 -1.1
Panama 0.5 0.5 0.5 928 2,157 2.9 -3.0
Nicaragua 0.7 0.5 0.4 683 1,324 2.3 .3.4
Honduras 1.0 0.6 0.4 680 1,031 1.4 -1.8
Haiti 1.6 0.8 0.2 363c 0.7 0.0
Latin Americè 30e(27f) 1.4
Countries ordered by average share in regional GDP between 1950 and 1985;
Latin America except Cuba; c 1960; 'preliminary;
e Venezuela data adjusted for changes in the terms of trade Venezuela data not
adj tasted for changesin the terms of trade.
Note: Thegrowth rate of Venezuela's per capita GD? between 1950 and 1980 is 1.9
percent per year in IMP': Ifl.E'orChile and Honduras, the average growth rate per
capita per year from Summers and Heston is 0.004 higher than in IMP:ifl. andfor
Nicaragua it is almost 0.01 larger. The average for Latin America is practically
unaffected by the growth rates of Honduras and Nicaragua due to their small share in
the population of the region.4
phenomenon.By 1988, with the exception of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and the
Dominican Republic, per capita CDP had fallen below its 1.980 level, At the
extreme, Venezuela, Nicaragua and El Salvador show levels below those attained
in 1960. The l980s have truly been a lost decade, and one underestimates
earlier achievement.
The second circumstance diminishing the accomplishment from 1950 to
1980 has been the surging performance of the Asian countries. Led by the four
newly industrializing countries of South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and
Taiwan, but extending to many others, Asia has vaulted ahead in the 1980s at
an average annualpercapita rate in excess of 5 percent. This contrast has
now been widely interpreted as proving the errors of the import substitution
strategy favored byLatin America through muchofthe post-War period. Twoof
the pillars of that strategy were emphasis upon industrialization through
governmental intervention and barriers to trade.
Commentators have recently argued forcefully against both. Angus
(adison(1985)contends:
"The economic growth performance of Latin America since 1973 has been
abysmal.. .there has.. .been a certain continuity in economic policy
attitudes since the l930s and the liberal international order which was
created by OECD countries and has influenced policy in Asia has left them
virtually untouched.w
Deepak tal's(1985)rejection of state intervention is another that
many now find attractive:
"The most serious current distortions in many developing countries are not
those flowing from the inevitable imperfections of market economy but the
policy induced, and thus far from inevitable, distortions created by
irrational dirizisme.S
Understanding the post-war experience is thus tmportant for policy
prescriptions that are currently being debated within Latin America. In this
paper we re-examine these three decades to provide a context for discussion of
the future. In section Il, we analyze the sources of growth, stressing the
evolutionary and adaptive experience of the region over these three decades.
In section III, we take a closer Look at the inflationary process within the
region and its determinants. In section IV, we call attention to the grave and
persistent problems of income distribution and poverty that these three
decades of overall growth failed to eliminate. Inequalityand asignificant
part of the population with inadequate nutrition, healthcare and housing
reflectanother side of the failure of the Latin American development process
that has received too little attention in recent years. The last section
brieflyconsiders theimplicationsof our conclusions forthepresent policy
discussion.
II. SOURCES OF GROWTH
During the l9SOs, most Latin Americancountriesmoved toward an
importsubstitution strategy) They chose this path because it seemed to fit.
Afterthe Great Depression of the1930sand the disruption of the second world
I There isa vast literature on the economic development of Latin America.
See,for instance, Beer (1977), Corbo (l988), Dietz (1987), Fishlow (1972),
Foxley (1976), Hirschman (1987, 1968), Klaren (1986) and Sheehan (1987).6
war, followed shortly thereafter by the Korean War boom and bust, the
international economy did not seem to be a propitious engine of growth. Nor
did the United States place economic development and Latin America high on the
agenda; the Marshall Plan instead gave priority to Europe and the Cold War.
Latin American economic writing and practice, influenced but not
determined by a group of economists working at the Economic Commission of
Latin America in Santiago under the leadership of Raul Prebisch, emerged
againstthis backdrop.These contributions amended the orthodox view of
economicgrowth throughcomparative advantage and capital accumulation in
threeways: the specification of macroeconomicustme, the identification
of microeconomic distortions and,followingfrom theabove, astrong role for
government intervention.
Attention to the foreign exchange constraint rather than savings as
the determinant of growth in peripheral countries was the principal
macroeconomic novelty. In a world where the terms of trade moved against
traditional primary export products,2 domestic production would have to
substitute for non-essential imports, leaving theforeignexchange for the
needed inputs. Moreover, while technical progress in agriculture would leave
Labor unemployed, dynamic industry could absorb the growing population with
increasing productivity and incomes. Domestic production required protection
2See Crilli (1988),7
against imports and deliberate bias against exports of resources that move
into industry.
In the microeconomic sphere, there was stress on imperfections and
discontinuities, both of which impeded effective operation of price signals.
Whether in agriculture, where land concentration was notorious, or in industry
where new privileges provided shelter from market forces, the competitive
model was flawed.
These macro- and microeconomic conditions militated in favor of a
strong state presence. Regulation and direction were needed. Development was a
consequence of policy, not a natural evolution. Conscious and comprehensive
planning was desirable; the Economic Coission of Latin America pioneered in
the application of input.output models in the region.
Importsubstitution wasa disequilibriumdevelopment strategy. It
confronted threelimitations that increasingly impacted upon performance
toward the end of the 1950s. One was deterioration in the balance of trade,
the second was sectoral imbalance, and the third was deterioration of the
public sector accounts.
Protection led to overvalued exchange rates and hence taxes on
exports. The consequence was an eventual reduction in export supply.
Industrialization in turn required increased inputs of capital goods and
intermediate imports. As trade deficits increased, foreign investment became a
critical requirement, not only for its modern technology but also its
provision of foreign exchange. This was an ironic and unanticipated8
consequence of a strategy deriving its strong political appeal from its
emphasis upon national productive capability.
In sectoral tens, import substitution policies exaggerated
industrial growth at the expense of agriculture, with three consequences.
First, food prices were kept artificially low, benefiting urban incomes at the
expense of rural incomes. Second, relatively capital intensive manufactures
absorbed only a diminishing fraction of the increment in the labor force,
swelling the service sector and placing pressure on government to serve as an
employer of last resort. Third, physical targets dominated cost effectiveness
calculations; it was as though the higher shadow price of foreign exchange
justified any project.
The third disequilibrium was fiscal. As the initial real resources
taxed away from primary exports began to give out, subsidies to industrial
investment had to come from explicit taxes. At the saSe time, government
responsibilities had increased, placing new pressures upon the budget from the
expenditure side. Monetization of the deficit was an irresistable lure and one
with nineteenth century precedent in Latin America. Inflation and need for
stabilization began to Lurk as a problem in several countries toward the end
of the l950s.
These disequilibria were temporarily averted by the Alliance for
Progress. New inflows of official capital simultaneously helped with the
external accounts and public sector deficits, while Pt 480 imports eased
supplies of food. Governments also attempted to correct some of the policy
excesses by more realistic exchange rates and greater promotion of exports.9
These efforts were not enough. By the mid-l960s, the Alliance was
itself faltering, the victim of changing policy perceptions in the United
States and Latin America alike. Reforms were not easy nor were resources
unlimited. More orthodox policies became the order of the day, frequently
under military tutelage, setting the stage for a new phase of economic
expansion.
The limits of the import substitution strategy were recognized.
Important modifications to commercial policy were introduced in the l960s.
Tariffs were frequently reduced, especially in the highest categories.
Crawlingpeg exchange rate systems accommodated to high domestic rates of
inflation and averted the overvaluation earlier so predominant. Explicit
concernfor inducing non-traditional exports produced special export subsidy
programs in manycountriesduring the period after 1965. in the context of a
morebouyant internationalmarket, suchreinforcements produced positive
resultsand export growth and diversification in the region increased.
At the same time, larger private capital inflows were an option for
which several countries of the region were eligible. From the end of the 1960s
and reinforced by the oil surpluses after 1973. the Euro-dollar market was in
pursuit of new takers and found many of them in the region. Governments could
finance both more imports as well as larger public sector deficits.
Domestic policies tended to retreat somewhat from regulation and
prices were given greater scope to direct resources. Still, the commitment to
industrialization remained. And that meant an intrusive role for the public10
sector even under the •orthodox policies pursued by military governments. The
Brazilian "miracle" was a clear lineal descendant of import substitution, not
to be confused with an outward orientation. The large domestic market still
dominated production decisions.
This period of adaptation and relatively successful adjustment of
the earlier model (growth rates showed improvement generally and not only in
Brazil) was brought to an abrupt end by the international disequilibrium
ushered in by the oil price rise in 1973.
The post-oil shock experience in the region was substantially
conditioned by mounting indebtedness and deterioration of domestic policy in a
more difficultexternal environment. This period sawthe rise of international
monetarismas a meansof reducing inflation in the Southern Cone countries, at
theexpense of a substantial increase in external liabilities.. It saw growing
indebtednessof oil producers based upon the new greater value of oil in the
ground. Finally, it saw Brazil labor under its progressively larger service
payments and domestic pressures to sustain its exhilarating pace of industrial
expansion. For the region as a whole, output growth slowed in the 1970s, but
remained at satisfactory levels.
The precariousness of the LatinAmerican economies only became
fullyapparent when a new oil price rise, an abrupt increase in real interest
rates and an OECD. recession coincided in the early l980s. Countries of the
region hadbadlychosen their adjustment style after 1973. It was not simply
that they blindly followed the original import substitution bias of the l9SOs,11
as Maddison has argued. Rather it was their specially asymmetric opening to
the world economy, featuring vast financial flows with much more limited trade
penetration. And new fiscal distortions reduced the room for maneuver. To make
growth continue in the late 1970s, government deficits were incurred that
could no longer be so easily financed. Stop-go macroeconomic responses could
be found in a much larger number of countries during this period, They were
but prelude to the stop-stop. policies that ultimately came to be necessary in
the 1980s.
A useful, synthetic view of this period as a whole ii provided by
considering its sources of growth within a simple production framework. Table
2starizes the regression results.The regressions use .quinquennial panel
datafor 18 Latin American countries.3 They provide an estimateof the net
return to investment and theelasticityof output to labor aswellas of the
contributionof other variables with potential influence on differential
efficiency. Thus •ahigber rate of increase of exports might be expected to
provide externalities over and above the direct contribution to output; that
is, of course, one of the central tenets of the argument in favor of a more
outward development strategy. The samekindof externalities might beexpected
fromimports in a structuralist foreign exchange constrained situation.
All Latin American countries except Cuba and Haiti, for lack of data. The
countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cbile, Colombia. Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.12
Two key results emerge from table 2. First, a straightforward two
factor approach, here labeled neo-classical, is markedly inferior to an
augmented definition of the production function that includes other variables
reflecting the degree of success in integration into the international
economy. Latin American growth required more than increased capital formation.
It also varied systematically with trade performance.
Roth export expansion and the growth rate of imports clearly
mattered. Exports were significant not only for their contribution to
productive efficiency, but also because higher earnings could avert recurrent
stabilization crises with adverse effects on output growth. More novel is the
finding that availability of imports exerted an independent influence. Import
substitution, successfully pursued, required imported inputs. Countries,
unable to obtain them and forced to curtail their foreign purchases
excessively, suffered. This access to imports, both through export earnings
and foreign finance, differentiated the successes from the failures. This is
where Brazil and Mexico diverged from the Southern Cone experience
Second, the evidence in table 2 strongly suggests that three
different sub-periods corresponding to different internal policies and
external conditions can be distinguished. The dummy variables are highly
statistically significant. The differences among these three periods are
clarified in the following three tables. Table 3 summarizes the sources of
growth for the 1950-65 period1 table 4 shows the equations for the decade
1965-75 and table S presents those for 1975-80.13
table 2: Growth, 1950-1980
Latin Americaa
Neoclassical Augmented
Constant 0.19 0.54 -0.97 -0.13 -2.50 -0.48
Investment 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.10
Share in CD? (1.94) (2.42) (2.45) (2.22) (3.36) (3.19)
Growth Rate 0.98 1.02 1.06 0.69 0.80, 0.73
of labor Force (3.22) (3.39) (3.45) (3.06) (3.75) (3.41)
Growth Rate 0.22 0.21 0.22
of Exports Volume (6.47) (6.85) (6.88)
Growth Rate 0.14 0.16 0.15
of Imports Volume (5.00) (5.99) (5.69)
Dummy 1 1.49 1.97
(2.31) (4.36)
Dummy 2 1.15 1.32
(1.76) (2.90)
Dummy 3 -1.33 -1.65
(-2.22) (-3.91)
0.19 0.23 0.23 0.57 0.64 0.63
a 18 countries; all Latin American countries except Cuba and Haiti; N —108.
Each observation corresponds to a five-year average. t-statistics in parentheses
Dummy 1 —Ifor 1950-1965, and 0 otherwise.
Dummy 2 —1for 1965-1975, and 0 otherwise.
Dummy 3 —1for 1975-1980, and 0 otherwise.
Data from ECLAL, Statistical Yearbook. 1983 and 1986; and investment ratios from
Summers et at., ou.s cit.14
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In each period, the augmented formuLation performs much better than
theneo-classical formulation in its explanation of output growth. In each
period, the interface with the international economy provides essential
information. By contrast, sheer size of the current purchases of the public
sector -- estimatesof its investment are included in the investment ratio --
doesnot seem to matter.
There are also differences between periods. Especially noteworthy
is the increasing contribution of export performance over time. Latin American
exports until the mid-l960s were almost exclusively primary exports. Although
world trade prospered in the l9SOs, it was newly oriented to the exchange of
manufactured products among industrial countries. Primary prices were quite
weak between 1955 and 1965: real export volume growth of S percent per year
until1963for all non-oil developing countries translated into growth of
purchasing power of only 2 percent per year. In the following twoperiods,and
especially after the oil, price increase in 1973, export capability played a
much greater part in determining aggregate growth.
At the same time, successful import substitution enabled the larger
and more rapidly growing economies to compress import requirements. After
1975, policy was already consciously addressed to this objective in most
countries of the region, and new protective barriers were erected. In contrast
to the coefficient for exports, imports exhibit a decline in importance in the
last sub-period.
The disaggregation also points to a falling significance of
investment. The estimate of the rate of return declines from not always17
productive, accumulation of capital under the impulse of increased foreign
savings. Many of the projects were longer term, moreover, and did not have a
principal impact Ln the shorter term. Later adjustment difficulties meant that
much investment never contributed.
The statistical analysis thus confirms an important association
between the level of output growth and successful Latin American integration
into theinternational economy.
III. INFLATION
Another special feature of Latin American development is the
ubiquity ofinflation.Table 6 presents the LatinAmericanrecord of inflation
overthis 30 year period. Two inferences are direct. One is a clear
distinctionamongcountries;the other isthe tendency for price increases to
accelerateover time.
Some countries in the region are recurrent offenders, while others,
becauseof the discipline of fixed exchange rates, have largely avoided highly
inflationary episodes. Among the former, Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay
standout.The small countries of Central America largely fall into the latter
camp; at an extreme is Panama, without its owncurrency issue. Virtuallyalone
among countries of the region, Colombia has managed to avoid surges of runaway
inflation while sustaining a moderate average.18
Table 6: Inflation Rates in Latin America
(Consumer prices: percent per year, average in the period)
1950-1980 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 81-85
CHILE 76.9 43.128.626.826.4 265.982.5 21.5
ARGENTINA 63.0 19.539.623.3 19.772.0 211.0 382.4
URUGUAY 41.6 11.823.630.765.171.256.7 45.9
BOLIVIA 33.9 70.683.2 5.2 5.9 22.518.0 2692.4
BRAZIL 33.2 16.825.7 62.327.721.252.0 153.9
PARACUAY 18.7 54.712.3 5.4 1.311.815.0 15.9
PERU 16.2 7.3 8.4 8.9 9.812.851.1 104.9
COLOMBIA 13.9 5.7 9.412.910.118.124.5 22.4
MEXICO 9.0 9.3 5.9 1.8 3.612.321.4 62.4
ECUADOR 6.0 2.9-0.14.05.013.611.7 28.1
EL SALVADOR 5.2 5.90.40.21.].8.912.8 14.7
COSTA RICA 4.8 2.21.52.12.614.18.2 37.4
DOMINICAN REP. 4.4 1.50.12.81.311.010.0 16.9
HONDURAS 4.2 7.4-0.62.72.06.49.8 7.0
GUATEMAlA 3.9 1.9-0.10.11.58.710.7 7.7
VENEZUELA 3.7 1.32.40.41.65.711.3 11.1
MAMA 2.7 0.6-0.10.91.67.36.9 3.3
Sources:IMP,InternationalFinancial Statistics, except for 1960and1961
inChile.19
Withthe oil price shock in 1973 came a new set of inflationary
pressures. Higher international prices of imports were magnified by nominal
devaluations in several countries. Despite slower growth, inflation showed a
tendency to increase. But, as Table 6 indicates, much larger effects were to
be felt after 1980. In the midst of real declines in per capita output.
inflation attained much higher levels than ever before in the post-War period.
Monetarists and stnicturalism are the twobasicinterpretations of
inflation in Latin America and twocorrespondingprograms for stabilization
are derived from them. According to monetarists, inflation is the result of
overspending:inflation in Latin America is thus caused by large budget
deficits financed by money creation. The private sector, while crowded out,
seekstosustain its position. To stop inflation, budget deficits must be cut.
Structuralisa,the opposing view, maintains that budget deficits
arenot at the heart of the matter. The basic causes of inflation lie in
supply shortages, bottlenecks and inconsistent claims of different groups in
society trying to get a larger share of the pie. Fiscal and monetary policy
are accommodating. For structuralists, administered controls on prices and
wages become the central component of stabilization policy. This is the only
way to stop inflation.
Both diagnoses of inflation are incomplete and thus their remedies
have consistently failed.4 From the 1950s to the l9BOs Latin America suffered
See Cardoso (1989) for a brief summary and references.20
from the application of numerous stabilization programs.5 These three decades
have seen more inflation acceleration than successful reduction. Within this
period, the most effective deceleration was the Chilean in the l9lOs. it was,
however, associated with special political circumstances and a flawed reliance
on fixed exchange rates that helped trigger a massive decline in income in the
early l9SOs.
The results from stabilization attempts were, in general.
unsatisfactory. Most typically, temporary reductions in inflation and external
deficits were combined with large increases in unemployment and a reduction of
the labor share in output. Pastor's (1987) empirical analysis of the
International Monetary Fund programs in Latin America in the period 1965-81
finds that Fund programs had mixed impacts on growth rates, led to rising
inflation and were associated with declines in the wage share. Equally
important, and for these reasons, the programs could not be sustained in their
implementation. Reaction against the IMP in Latin America has a long history;
it is not aerel.y a product of the debt crisis.
The Brazilian experience in the mid-sixties is now often cited as
an example of a successful orthodox program. There are two caveats. First, it
should be recognized that the stabilization program of mid-1960s in Brazil. was
not strictly orthodox, as it did make use of price and wage policy. Real wages
Stabilization programs were implemented, for instance, in Chile (1956-58,
1973-78), Argentina (1959-62, 1976-78), Bolivia (1956), Peru (1959, 1975-78),
Uruguay (1959-62. 1974-78), Mexico (1983) and Brazil (1964-68, 1982-83).21
were supposed to be maintained at their previous average level. Instead they
became the residual factor when inflation proved to be resistant to
application of restrictive fiscal policy. Prices were subject to some controls
as well as held in check by the incentive of favored access to credit. As a
consequence of these efforts inflation did decline between 1964 and 1966; in a
final stage, a further reduction was facilitated by renewed growth and
productivity increases.
Second, there was a high cost borne by the wage earners whose
residualclaim on income helped to make stabilization possible. The objective
isnot only to reduce inflation, but at minimal expense. In this case, the
burden fell not so much upon output as uponreal wages and a deterioration of
the income distribution. Such wage compression was enforced1 as in Chile, by
political repression.
Inthe late l970s, in part because previous policies had not been
effective,a new and mote radical policy direction becamepopälarin the
Southern Cone. Restoring the role of free markets became the dominant ideology
of neoconservantism. Its strategy consisted of: 1) freeing prices, 2)
eliminating quantitative restriàtions on trade and reducing tariffs, 3)
promotinga domestic capital market by freeing interest rates and eliminating
controlsover the allocation of credit, 4) promoting the free entryand exit
ofcapital and 5) reducing the participation of thepublic sector in
production.22
Ramos(1986) offers an excellent guided tour through the ups and
downs of the neoconservative experience in Argentina. Chile and Uruguay.6 What
distinguishes the neoconservative programs in the Southern Cone in the lace
l9lOs from other orthodox programs is the reliance on the exchange rate to
achieve disinflation. The neoconservative approach is based on global
monetarism.This theory maintains that a fixed exchange rate determines the
prices of tradables and becomes the central price around which price
expectations can be formed. A fixed exchange rate is thusthebasic vehicle of
disinflation,while fiscal discipline restricts demandand avoids undermining
theprogram.
Theory diverges from practice because of significant lags and a
limited degree of Import competition. So long as there is inflation inertia.
non-tradable prices are not frozen and domestic tradable prices are not set by
international prices, overvaluation will occur. Overvaluation in turn implies
large current account deficits and stimulates capital flight. The accumulation
of debt, and its service, becomes so great as to force a policy reversal. An
inevitable devaluation provokes another round of inflation.
The Argentine experience is prototypical. At the beginning of 1916
in Argentina. inflation had reached 400 percent when, once again, the military
took power. Martinez de Hoz was in charge of the economic team for five years.
6 See also the special issues of Ecncmic Develornent and Cultural Chanee
(1986) and World Develooment (1985).23
The first phase of the disinflation program relied on wage controls. At the
sane time, the fiscal deficit was gradually reduced. These policies brought
about favorable results on the inflation front. In December 1978, a new price-
stabilization program was instituted. The resultant reduction of inflation was
bought at the price of a huge overvaluation. By 1981, the overvaluation had
precipitated massive capital flight and external debt. The collapse of the
exchangerate that followed brought about a new inflationary surge. Using the
exchange rate as a principal tool to combat inflation can lead to highly
unstableoutcomes.
The most recent experiences of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the
1980s afford an interesting continuity despite their new dimension of a large
external debt.They help underline the key role played in Latin American
inflation during the last thirty years by the external balance. Just as output
growth in the region must take into account external integration, so must the
circumstances of internal macro-economic disequilibrium. Easily financed
current account deficits made for relatively low inflation. Balance of
paymentscrises translated into higher interest rates and credit rationing as
well as inflationary pressures generated by realignment of exchange rates.
What counts is not only the size of the public deficit but the capacity to
finance it. In the l980s, one sees the salience of this point in the context
ofincreasing debt service. Countries financed the purchase of foreign
exchange not through taxes but by issuing domestic debt or printing money. As
a consequence, inflation rates more than doubled in the l9BOs. (See table 6).24
A second aspect of Latin American inflation is the prevalence of
indention. The pervasiveness of high inflation has created mechanisms of
institutional defense. All key prices in the economy -- theexchange rate,
interest rate and wage rate -- tendto have automatic adjustments in response
to price level changes. Indexing averts the large changes in relative prices
that typically occurred in the l9SOs in Latin America. It does so, however, at
the expense of building additional rigidities into inflation and making
disinflation, particularly front high levels, virtually iwpossible under
orthodox programs. Inertia matters.
But the special kind of incomes policy established by indexing is
also far from neutral. Certain groups benefit and others lose depending upon
the choice of index and the degree to which adjustment is forward or backward
looking; a special case earlier discussed was Brazil in the aid-1960s,
lieterodox programs which take the current relative prices as equilibrium
because of high inflation can err. Return to an average real wage will, not
necessarily prove a guarantee that structural and distributional components of
inflation are eliminated. Incomes policy has to do more than coordinate the
responses of different price setters.
table 7 provides information on the effects of inflation upon per
capita income growth in the region. The regressions use quinquennial panel
data for 17 Latin American countries.7 For the period as a whole, there is a
'
Cuba,Haiti and Nicaragua are excluded front the sample because of the lack
of data.25
negative correlation. This result is replicated for each of the sub'periods,
with the coefficient beinè largest and most statistically significant in the
interval 1950-65. The average impact is not trivial: an inflation rate of even
20 percent reduces the per capita growth rate by 0.4 percentage point, or
almost 15 percent of the regional mean of 3 percent growth between 1950 and
1980.
This result does not hold, however, once high inflation
observations are excluded. (See lower panel of table 7). If the sample is
limited to all. 5-year averages less than 50 percent, there is no systematic
effect of inflation upon growth. And in the period 1965-75, the effect is
actually positive, reflecting the degree to which spreading indexing
facilitatedadaption to inflationary pressures of modest levels. The
appropriate conclusion, therefore, and consistent with the experience after
1980, is that moderate inflation was not a serious handicap, but that much
higherrates exert a palpable cost. Atrates of 20 to 30 percent a month, one
cannotavoid a high degree of variance in relative prices and attendant
uncertainty, not to speak of instability.
Much of the empirical analysis of Latin American inflation in
recent years has been in test of the implications of rational expectations
theory for the effects of unanticipated money growth on real output growth and
the price level. Conclusions have not been uniform, but are sensitive to model
structure, country sample and period of observation. A recent study by
Canarella and Pollard (1989) explores the relation between-money, the price26
level and growth in 16 Latin American countries between 1950 and 1983. While
the empirical results conform broadly to the view chat unanticipated money
growth has positive effects on output and negative effects on the price level,
they are hardly decisive. Consistent with our emphasis upon external factors,
the coefficient on money growth is generally not of unitary elasticity as
predicted. The pattern of output response, moreover, is qutte sluggish and
highly variable across countries; the price level effect is equally far from
uniform, nor are the cumulative coeficients consistent with those in the
output equation.
While at one time struccuralists were prone to argue in favor of a
favorable inflation-output relationship in the region, few defend such a
poeition at the exaggerated rates now being recorded in many of the countries
of the region. More sophisticated financial markets registering daily
expectations and indexing at more and more frequent intervals leave little
scope for unanticipated price increases, let alone a positive impact. The old
debate between monetarists and struccuralists has given way to generalized
recognition of the need for better macro•econoaic policy and return to much
lower inflation rates27
Table 7:Inflation and Growth, Latin Aaericaa
1950-801950-801950-801950-80 1950-651965-751975-80
Constant 2.54 3.00 2.34 2.49 2.48 3.04 2.53
Inflation Rate -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01







0.08 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.01
a 17 countries; all Latin American countries except Cuba, Haiti andNicaragua.
Latin Aaerica1
1950-801950-801950-801950-801950-651965-751975-80
Constant 2.50 2.80 2.27 2.51 2.40 1.65 2.66
Inflation Rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.14 -0.02







R2 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.24 0.01
b 13countries; excludes Argentina, Bolivia. Chile. and Uruguay from previous sample.
Dummy 1 —1for 1950-1965, and 0 otherwise.
Dummy 2 —1for 1965-1915, and 0 otherwise.
Dummy3—ifor 1975-1980, and 0 otherwise.
t-seatistics in parentheses.
Data: Income per capita growth rates from Summers et al., ODUS cit, and inflation
rates from flip, International Financial Statistics.28
IV. POVERTYAND INCOMEDISTRIBUTION
Perhapsthebiggest limitation ofLatinAmerican development in the
post•War period hasbeenits modest social achievements in the processof
economic growth. Growth is essential for achieving social goals. But growth is
not enough. Economic growth and industrialization in Latin America blended
withmass poverty, socialtensions, regionalimbalances, widespreadpolitical
instabilityand acute injustice.8
Who are the poor?
Altimir<1982) develops a widely used definition of poverty for ten
Latin Americancountriesin the 1970s on the basis ofavailablehousehold
surveys and population censuses. His poverty lines (annual household
consumption per capita ranging frois 150 to 250 dollars of 1970) are country
specific based on the cost of a nutritionally adequate diet multiplied by two.
According to Altimir's estimate, in 1970, 40 percent of Latin American
householdswere poor end had an average purchasing power from 40 to 55 percent
belowthe poverty line. Only in Argentinathe income gap was aslow as 25
percent. The extent of poverty was higher in rural than in urban areas in all
Latin American countries. Even in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, the most
heavily urbanized countries in the region, the extent of rural poverty was not
lessthan 20 percent of rural households. In Mexico, the three bottom deciles
8 Cardoso and Helwege (1989) provide a survey of the literature on poverty in
Latin America.29
of the income distribution were entirely rural. In Brazil, 70 percent of the
lowest four deciles in the mid-1970s were rural households. The poorest are
usually landless laborers who purchase all or a large part of their food. In
the urban areas the poorest are self employed (rather than wage earners),
workers in construction (the most likely entry point for immigrants) and
persons working in public make-work programs such as those in Chile.
In 1970, the extent of destitution (risk of severe nutritional
deficiency) varied quite substantially from 1 percent of the population in
Argentina to 45 percent in Honduras. About one fifth of all, households in
Latin America had incomes that were insufficient to pay for an adequate diet.
Xusgrove's (1985) study of nutrition in 10 Latin American cities in 1966-69
confirmedthe high levels of destitution poverty, ranging from 18 percent in
Caracas to 56 percent in Quito. Table 8 shows different estimates of the
percentage of population living in poverty in 1970 for 12 Latin American
countries,
The basic survey data from which the indices of poverty are drawn
present many problems. These surveys undercount disproportionately poor groups
and those in surveys underreport their incomes (as shown by comparisons with
independent sources of data). Onethereforehas more confidence in the
measurementof trends than in figures for any one year. Molina (1982)
published an update of Altimir's work, based on the assumption that poverty
lines grew at one-fourth the rate of average income i,n any country. Despite30





Brazil 17.3 25 49 54
Mexico 4.2 12 34 48
Argentina 1 8 28
Venezuela 4.6 10 25 38
Colombia 13.1 18 45 48
Peru 25.3 25 50 48
Chile 0.9 6 17 39
Uruguay 6.1 10a 25a
Costa Rica 1.5 6 24 36
Honduras 27.5 45 65 58
Ecuador 21.5
El Salvador 20.8
Notes; Kakvani's poverty tine is 150 dollars of 1970.
Altiair's poverty lines for 1970: th. national averages of the line of
destitution, A, vary between 81 dollars for Honduras and 151 dollars for
Argentina. The national averages of the line of absolute poverty, B, vary
between 162 dollars for Honduras and 296 dollars for Argentina. Relative
poverty, C, is defined as less than half the average per capita income of all
households.
a urban poverty.
Sources: Kalcwani, onus cit.; Oscar Altimir, The Extent_of £verty in Latin
America. World Bank Staff Working Paper Number 522, Washington D.C., World
Bank, 1982.31
Table9:Incidence of Poverty InLatin America
1910-1981
1970 1981
Head Counta Poverty Gap1' Head counta Poverty c7apb
Arsentina 8.0 0.5 8.0 0.5
Brazil 49.0 8.2 43.0 4.2
Chile 17.0 1.9 16.0 1.6
Colombia 45.0 7.7 43.0 5.3
Costa Rica 24.0 3.6 22.0 2.1
Honduras 65.0 23.1 64.0 21.8
Mexico 34.0 3.9 29.0 2.6
Panama 39.0 6.8 37.0 5.7
Peru 50.0 13.4 49.0 12.8
Venezuela 25.0 2.8 24.0 3.6
All 10 39.0 5.3 35.0 3.6
a Percent of population below the poverty line.
b Shortfall of theaverage income of the poor from the poverty line as a
proportion of GDP.
Source: Sergio iblina, Poverty: Description aM Analysis of Policies for
Overcoming Itt' CEPAL Review, no.18,December1982.32
considerablegrowth in the 1970s, the consequences are disappointing. Table 9
shows only a slight drop in the percentage of the population living in poverty
in most countries in 1981 compared to 1970. with substantial progress in
Brazil and Mexico. Because of their weight in regional total, the incidence of
poverty in Latin America dropped from 39 percent to 35 percent. Nonetheless,
the numbers of poor increased.
Although the number of poor increased, they undoubtedly saw some
improvement in their standard of living between 1950 and 1980 as health and
schooling improved. Growth of the urban population brought expanded
opportunities. Life expectancy in Latin America increased from 55 years in
1960 to 63.7 years in 1980 and infant mortality declined 107 per thousand to
69 per thousand. Access to literacy rose. The data in table 10 show a strong
positive correlation between incomes per head and life expectancy, as well as
between incomes per head and life expectancy. There is no correlation between
tncoaes perhead and infantmortality rates.
Aggregatesmayoverstate. Merrick (1989), for instance, asserts the
existence of a dual population structure in Brazil. He shows a modem
demographic elite passing through the mortality transition and into controlled
natality at a pace similar to late industrializing societies. This southeast-
urban sector coexists with the northeast-rural sector where high fertility and
mortality rates correspond to the level of traditional underdeveloped
societies.33
Table 10: Economic and Social Indicators
LatinAmericaa,1980
CD? Urban Infant Life Fopu Lite-
perPopulationMorta- Expec-lation racy
headb(% of lity tancy per Ratio
(index) total) (per (years) physician
thousand) (1981) (1978)
Y > $2,000 in 1980
1. Venezuela 100.0 83 41.7 67.4 1,000 82
2. Uruguay 98.8 84 39.7 70.9 500 94
3. Argentina 96.9 82 45.2 70.4 540g
4. Mexico 76.9 67 56.0 65.2 1,210 82h
5.Chile 71.7 81 43.2 67.1 1,930 89
6. Costa Rica 65,6 43 27.5 72.2 1,440
7.Panama 65.2 54 21.7 70.4 1,010 82
8. Brazil 65.0 68 83.3 63.1 1,300 76
'C > $1,000 in 1980
9. Colombia 56.9 64 56.4 62.9
10. Paraguay 53.0 39 46.8 64.6 1,750 84
11. Peru 52.7 65 87.7 51.1 1,440 80
12. Dominican Rep. 47.3 51 68.3 61.4 1,400 67
13. Ecuador 47.0 45 81.6 61.2 760 77
14. Guatemala 43.0 39 65.9 58.5 8,610 4i
15.Nicaragua 40.0 53 90.5 56.4 2,230 90
16. Bolivia 33.7 44 131.3 50.2 2,000 63k
17. Honduras 31.1 36 88.5 58.2 3,100 60
'C C $1,000 in 1980
18. El Salvador 27.2 41 77.9 63.0 2,550 62
19. Haiti 13.3 28 114.6 53.2 9,200 23h
Latin America except Cuba, countries ordered by size of GD? per capita in 1980.
Indices of GD? per capita in 1980, Venezuela —100.Venezuela GDP per capita not
corrected for changes in the terms of trade —3,310dollars of 1975.
g 1980; 1980; 1970; 1 1975; k 1916.
Sources: Summers and Heston, ODUS cit.World Bank, World Tables; EM?. Tnternattona
Financial Statistics, PREALC, and ECLAC.34
Relative shares of income also count. They are relevant not only to
issues of equity, but to the assessment of policies to overcome absolute
poverty. Average income per capita in most Latin American countries exceeds
chat in the majority of African and Asian countries1 yet extremepoverty
persists as a result of unequal income distribution. In the Latin American
context it is impossible to look at poverty without considering redistribution
as a potential solution.
Table 11 presents the share of the richest quintile as a multiple
of the poorest quintile, as well, as Cmiindicesfor 13 Latin American
countries. The levels of inequality depicted 'by these indices are striking as
they exceed those found in most other parts of the developing world. There is
little indication that the situation has much improved after 1970. Moreover1
there is reason to believe that the l980s has shown an increased share of
income going to capital and declines to labor, thereby leading to further
deterioration. While efforts to eradicate absolute poverty appear feasible in
resource cost1 although difficult to implement, relative inequality may prove
much more stubborn. From the standpoint of politics, extreme relative
inequality may create adiscontent that hampers effective economic policies.
What can_be done?
Between the l9SOs and 1980s different strategies to attack poverty
became fashionable. From an emphasis upon economic growth, focus shifted to
the basic needs approach and now back again to the belief that only growth can
reduce poverty. But despite the limited aggregate resources needed to reduce35
Table 11: Income Shares and Cmi Indices
14 LatinAmericancountries, circa 1970
Income Share of Income Share of Cthi Index
bottow 20* top 20* as multiple
(percent) of bottoa 20*
a b a b c a
-c
Brazil 3.0 2.0 21 33 15 .574 .500
Mexico 3.7 2.9 15 20 16 .524 .567
Argentina 6.9 4.4 7 11 7 .437 .425
Venezuela 2.7 3.0 24 18 18 .622 .531
Colombia 3.5 17 15 .557 .520
Peru 1.9 32 •26 .591
Chile 4.8 12 14 +506 .503
Ecuador 3.5 16 24 .526 .625
Doainican Rep. 4.3 13 .493
El. Salvador 3.2 18 11 .539 +532
Costa Rica 5.0 3.3 11 17 9 .416 .466
Panama 3.0 20 24 .557 .558
Uruguay 13 .449
Honduras 21 .612
For comparison; Developed Countries
Average 5.5 9 .380
Sources:
a ManekKakvani,Income Ineaualitv andPoverty:Methods of Estimation and
Policy 1mvlicattj, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980;
b World develotnient reDort 1988, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
c Jacques Lecaillon et aL,Income Distributionand Economic Devel.Q2pent:An
Analytical Survey, Cenva: International Labor Office, 1984.36
destitution poverty, projects have failed successfully to target the poor.
They have increased as fast as population. And the promise of growth has given
way to a lost decade of development in the 1980s.
Peasant leaders and leftist politicians claim that land reform is
the solution to poverty and inequality in the rural areas of Latin Merica.
-History shows that it succeeded politically only when imposed by revolutionary
governments committed to breaking the power of the landed oligarchy. But in
four countries in the region where it took place (Mexico, Cuba, Peru and
Nicaragua) it achieved neither social justice nor economic efficiency. The
Bolivian outcome seems to have been somewhat more successful. Agrarian reform
has tended to recede as an option since the Alliance for Progress, in favor of
urban migration andagriculturalcredit as a solution to rural poverty.
In the absence of a revolution (and even thatdoesnot appear to be
sufficient) what can be done? Glewwe andvan dat Gag (t98) divide policies
to assist the poor into three types: relative price changes, direct transfers
and changing the characteristics of the poor.
Changingrelative prices remains the mostcommon strategy despite
compellingcriticism.The costs of this policy include significant leakages as
well as large efficiency costs. Their appeal is their immediate, if only
nominal,consequences. These are deceptive. Onevalidconclusion from the
Latin American experience is that government ordered nominal wage increases as
a tool of redistribution do not work.
Direct transfers have a big advantage: they directly benefit the
poor. Their limitation derives from the difficulty of targeting and the37
absence of a vocal constituency. The poor are seen as undeserving of special
efforts and there is concern that no permanent gains will be realized. The
fiscal constraint faced by most Latin American governments precludes much
advance on this front. Indeed there has probably been retrogression as
expenditures in behalf of the poorest may have suffered proportionally larger
cuts.
Changing the characteristics of the poor remains the most appealing
strategy because it removes one of the most important causes of poverty. The
most general characteristic of the poor in Latin America is an inferior
educational background in both formal schooling and skills training.
Thereare significant externalities for growth itself from
expenditures on publicly provided education and health services. Primary
education is an important means for raising productivity and hence growth.
This also holds true for health expenditures. Correa (1970) has argued that
improvementsin health and nutrition added 0.12 to 0.93 percentage points to
the rate of economic growth in nine Latin American countries between 1950-62.
-
NormanHicks (1980) has estimated that a 10 year increase in life expectancy
raises per capita CD? growth rates by 1.1 percentage points and a 10
percentage points increase in literacy rates raise per capita GD? growth by
0.3 percentage point,. David Wheeler's (1980) findings indicate significant
impact on growth rates from increases in calorie intake and in literacy rates.
Robin Morris's (1982) study found that primary education enrollments had a
favorable effect on growth race, of per capita income.38
In the end, the stark poverty and income distribution problem in
Latin America measure the failure of the post-War development process. No
exclusive strategy can work. Restored economic growth, more attention to
absolute poverty and basic needs as well as a continuing commitment to
increased capability and mobility are necessary. As significant as technical
design is the inability politically to reconcile attention to poverty and
inequality with policies that sustain macro-economic equilibrium and economic
growth.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Latin America now faces the 1990s. The experience during the thirty
years from 1950 to 1980 provides bases both for optimis. as well as caution.
Countries in the region have demonstrated a capacity for sustained expansion
at relatively high rates over an extended period of time. In so doing, they
have also demonstrated a degree of adaptability and pragmatism. Ideology has
not dominated economic policy-making over extended periods in the face of poor
performance -
Onthe debit side, countries have failed to establish a record of
credible and consistent policy. The public sector stands out as a major
weakness. Instead of a progressive strengthening, one sees accelerating
debility in many countries. Recovering the ability to lead the development
process is necessary but not easy. Several political leaders have tried
without much success, as inflation barometers sadly register.39
Most fundamentally, poverty anddistributionproblems loon as
powerful obstacles to the reqaired increases ininvestmentratios that
virtuallyall countries must undertake in order to resume growth at
satisfactoryrates. The prospects for zero-sum perspectives seem more probable
than cooperative solutions. The proliferation of capital flight creates even
more diversity of interest and unequalizing claims on wealth.
Technocratic solutions, predominant in many countries from the mid-
l960s, do not seem to be an answer that will hold in the future. For one, in
many instances it was the technocrats that papered over the fragilities of the
1970. and provoked a much worse reaction in the 1980.. For another, the
opening of politics precludes such a reversion. Instead one will have to rely
onmorelimited areas of regulation and intervention and more decentralization
and use of .arket signals. Perhaps by focusing on social policy1 the great
failure of growth until now, arid by providing scope for more, but not
exclusive, private initiative, a more appropriate Latin American model will
begin to unfold.40
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